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Experimental releases of genetically
modified (GM) insects are reportedly
being evaluated in various countries,
including Brazil, the Cayman Islands
(United Kingdom), France, Guatemala,
India, Malaysia, Mexico, Panama, Philip-
pines, Singapore, Thailand, the United
States of America, and Vietnam. GM
mosquitoes (Aedes aegypti) have already
been released for field trials into inhabited
areas in the Cayman Islands (2009–?),
Malaysia (2010–2011), and Brazil (2011–
2012). Here, we assess the regulatory
process in the first three countries per-
mitting releases (Malaysia, US, and the
Cayman Islands) in terms of pre-release
transparency and scientific quality. We
find that, despite 14 US government–
funded field trials over the last 9 years (on
a moth pest of cotton), there has been no
scientific publication of experimental da-
ta, and in only two instances have permit
applications been published. The world’s
first environmental impact statement
(EIS) on GM insects, produced by US
authorities in 2008, is found to be
scientifically deficient on the basis that
(1) most consideration of environmental
risk is too generic to be scientifically
meaningful; (2) it relies on unpublished
data to establish central scientific points;
and (3) of the approximately 170 scientific
publications cited, the endorsement of the
majority of novel transgenic approaches is
based on just two laboratory studies in
only one of the four species covered by
the document. We find that it is not
possible to determine from documents
publically available prior to the start of
releases if obvious hazards of the partic-
ular GM mosquitoes released in Malaysia,
the Cayman Islands, and Brazil received
expert examination. Simple regulatory
measures are proposed that would build
public confidence and stimulate the
independent experimental studies that
environmental risk assessments require.
Finally, a checklist is provided to assist the
general public, journalists, and lawmakers
in determining, from documents issued by
regulators prior to the start of releases,
whether permit approval is likely to have
a scientifically high quality basis.
Over the last 2 years there has been a
dramatic increase in activities relating to
the experimental release of GM insects
into the environment. It is reported that
commercially generated male GM mos-
quitoes were experimentally released into
populated areas in the Cayman Islands
starting in November 2009 [1,2]. A small-
scale release of the same GM mosquitoes
was granted approval to take place from
December 2010 to January 2011 at two
inhabited sites in Malaysia (Pahang and
Melaka [3]); however, it was retrospec-
tively announced that only a single release
had taken place at an uninhabited location
(Bentong, Pahang). A large-scale release of
the same mosquitoes is reported to have
started in the Brazilian city of Juazeiro in
February 2011 and will continue into
2012, resulting in the release of a total of
more than 3 million mosquitoes ([4];
February 2011 was also the same month
this manuscript was originally submitted
for peer review). Other countries that are
reported to be evaluating the release of
GM insects include France [5,6], Guate-
mala [7], India [8], Mexico [2], Panama
[9], Philippines [10], Singapore [9], Thai-
land [5], the US [11], and Vietnam [5]. In
September 2010, the European Food
Safety Authority (EFSA) published a
document entitled Defining Environmental
Risk Assessment Criteria for Genetically Modified
(GM) Insects to Be Placed on the EU Market,
further illustrating the global extent of
interest in releasing GM insects [12].
The first generation of GM insect
technologies discussed here has been
developed for use in sterile insect tech-
nique (SIT) programs designed to sup-
press insect populations that spread hu-
man disease or are agricultural pests (see
Supporting File S1 for an extended
glossary to assist non-specialist readers
with most abbreviated terms used in this
manuscript). SIT is a pest eradication and
suppression technique employed widely
across the world [13–15], and for the last
60 years it has been based on radiation
sterilization of males (see Supporting File
S1 for a brief explanation of SIT). SIT
programs generally involve releasing large
numbers of sterile males (which are
generally innocuous) of the same pest
species at a high enough frequency that
the probability of wild females mating
with wild fertile males is greatly lowered.
If the frequency of matings with sterile
males is sufficiently high over successive
generations, a dramatic reduction in the
pest population size can result. SIT is
species specific and does not involve the
dispersion of any chemicals or the release
of any novel species into the environment.
Transgenic GM approaches to SIT may
potentially increase the efficiency and
flexibility of SIT control programs com-
pared to radiation-based SIT [16], al-
though this awaits an empirical demon-
stration. While both radiation and GM-
based SIT can be argued to be environ-
mentally friendly ways to control insect
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[17]), it is also recognized that GM insect
technologies can ‘‘potentially provoke
serious public mistrust and resistance to
their implementation’’ [18]. Furthermore,
it has been noted that ‘‘[GM insects] are
not likely to be viewed in isolation, but as
a part of a wider debate over develop-
ments in biotechnology (i.e. GM plants,
stem cell research, animal cloning, etc.)
and the perception of these, fuelling
scepticism and/or antagonism’’ [19].
Consequently, companies focused on
commercial GM insects and independent
scientists who think that GM insect
applications warrant evaluation have re-
peatedly identified the need for high
quality multi-disciplinary scientific re-
search in this area. This is in addition to
the need for transparency and public
involvement in the regulatory approval
process for any environmental releases
[18–25]. When considering GM insects, it
is important to appreciate that genetic
modification/engineering is a highly flex-
ible technology capable of generating an
almost unlimited variety of genetic chang-
es, creating organisms with a broad range
of novel properties. Consequently, discus-
sion is generally only informative if it is
clearly defined what type of genetic
modification is being considered, rather
than attempting to regard multiple GM
approaches as a single unified entity. The
properties of transgenic constructs that
have so far been considered in regulatory
documents can usefully be separated into
two classes:
1 Fluorescent markers. Genetic
modifications that express only trans-
genic fluorescent proteins. Using a
microscope with epi-fluorescence op-
tics [26], it is possible to distinguish
fluorescent individuals released from
rearing facilities (or their progeny)
from wild non-florescent individuals.
Fluorescent markers are of particular
value in monitoring the size of the
wild pest population during SIT
releases. An additional elaboration is
the monitoring of the mating success
of sterile released males through the
presence of fluorescent sperm in wild
females [27].
2 Repressible dominant lethal
(RDL). Genetic modifications that
are designed to conditionally kill
offspring inheriting them. Such con-
structs can be engineered to have very
distinct properties: (a) sterilising con-
structs; engineered to kill all the off-
spring of individuals released into the
environment and intended to replace
the use of radiation for sterilization
[28–32]; (b) sexing constructs; engineered
to kill females prior to releases in SIT
programs, where only males are re-
quired for release [33–36]; and (c)
female-killing constructs; engineered for
use in SIT programs, to kill all
daughters of individuals released into
the environment but not their sons
[34,35]. Theoretically, the use of
female-killing constructs can be more
efficient than the use of fully sterile
constructs where lethality is not sex
selective [16].
While properties of the particular
constructs so far considered in regulatory
documents can be reduced to the above
two classes, many can also be combined
to generate a desired set of joint proper-
ties (e.g., fluorescently marked, female-
killing constructs). It is important to note
that all the transgenic constructs discussed
here in the context of existing field trials
are not intended to become stably estab-
lished in the environment (i.e., in the
absence of continued release of GM
insects, the introduced transgenes are
likely to ultimately be lost from a wild
fertile population). Consequently, they are
considered to be a type of genetic
modification with the lowest environmen-
tal concern (Table 2 on page 19 and
section 5.3.4.2 in [21]). While currently
premature, it is in the authors’ opinion
quite conceivable that given sufficient
experimental evidence (see discussion),
constructs within these classes could at
some point in the future justifiably be
subject to minimal regulation.
Given the recent increase in regulatory
activities involving GM insects across the
world, we have chosen to examine the pre-
release regulatory processes in the first
three countries known to have authorized
free releases of GM insects into the
environment: the US, the Cayman Is-
lands, and Malaysia. This is done from the
perspective of (1) the transparency of the
regulatory process; and (2) identifying the
scope of the scientific evidence on which
regulatory decisions were made. There is a
particular focus on the US regulatory
experience as the US has by far the
longest record of regulatory decisions on
GM insects and it is currently being
promoted as a global regulatory model
[22,37]. This article does not seek to
directly evaluate the outcome of the
regulatory decisions made, but is intended
to provide a generally understandable
analysis of how scientifically relevant
aspects of the decision-making process
were conducted.
A Short History of US GM Insect
Regulation 2001–2010
The US has approved 14 field trials
since 2001 with pink bollworm (Pectinophora
gossypiella), a moth that is an agricultural
pest of the cotton plant. The federal US
authority responsible for the regulation of
GM insects that are potential plant pests is
the Animal and Plant Health Inspection
Service (APHIS), an agency of the United
States Department of Agriculture (USDA).
The APHIS unit responsible for granting
field trial permits is Biotechnology Regu-
latory Services (BRS-APHIS), which acts
in consultation with state regulators.
Permit applications for field trials of GM
insects are submitted to BRS-APHIS and
contain a comprehensive description of
the proposed experiment(s) [38]. Applica-
tions have only been made publically
available for two of the 14 granted permits
(and none of the five withdrawn ones or
the one pending application [39]). With
the exception of the two published per-
mits, all available application information
is limited to the notification details pub-
lished on the APHIS website, a 2010
example of which is copied below [39].
10-074-102r [application ID]
United States Department of Agriculture/
Animal and Plant Health Inspection
Service [Name of permit applicant]
Reg article: Pink bollworm [species]
MG-Dsred Fluorescent Protein Expression
[description of genetic modification]
Releases in: AZ [state]
Release [type of permit: release or
inter-state movement]
Received: 15-MAR-2010
Status: Issued 13-APR-2010
Both of the publically available permits
were published as parts of Environmental
Assessment documents (EA, a concise
environmental impact assessment docu-
ment in the US regulatory system). The
first EA was published in 2001 (2001-EA,
[40]) for a caged field trial with fluores-
cently marked pink bollworms, and a
second one for a free release field trial of
the same stock in 2005 (2005-EA, [41]).
All permits granted by BRS-APHIS have
been to other research units within the
same US government agency, APHIS. To
date no granted permits have been directly
applied for by commercial companies,
though it is clear that some permits are
being applied for by US government
agencies to provide information on com-
mercial stocks (see below).
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entitled Use of Genetically Engineered Fruit
Fly and Pink Bollworm in APHIS Plant Pest
Control Programs (2008-EIS, [42]). The
document considers the potential integra-
tion of GM insects into ongoing SIT
programs run by APHIS in the following
four agricultural pest species: pink boll-
worm moth (P. gossypiella), Mediterranean
fruit fly (Ceratitis capitata), Mexican fruit fly
(Anastrepha ludens), and oriental fruit fly
(Bactrocera dorsalis). The 2008-EIS formed
the basis for an announcement in May
2009 that APHIS will ‘‘permit integration
of genetically engineered insects into its
plant pest control and eradication pro-
grams’’ ([11]; see Supporting File S2 for a
more extended summary of US regulato-
ry history). EIS documents are described
as the most comprehensive documents
produced in the US regulatory system;
however, they are not necessarily scien-
tifically more rigorous than the alternative
EA documents, which are considered
‘‘concise’’ [43,44]. This is because EIS
documents can have a very broad scope,
as they are principally intended to
evaluate the impact of proposed agency
policy changes on a broad ‘‘programmat-
ic’’ basis at a national level. EA docu-
ments instead are generally focused on
specific actions in a single species at
named locations (contrast 1372.5 sections
a and b [43]).
The 2008-EIS as a Regulatory
Document of Global Scientific
Value
The 2008-EIS is currently actively
promoted as a document to establish
global precedents [22,37] and was recently
described by one of its principal authors
(an independent biotechnology regulatory
consultant/agent) in the following terms:
Use of genetically engineered fruit fly and
pink bollworm in APHIS plant pest control
programs is the title of the world’s first
environmental impact statement
(EIS) on any kind of transgenic
organism, either plant or animal,
prokaryote or eukaryote. This pro-
grammatic EIS is also a major part
of the world’s first official govern-
ment regulatory process on any
transgenic insect […]
This EIS is of major value for
genetic markers and Aedes, possibly
Anopheles, sterile insect technique
(SIT) population suppression using
repressible lethal genetic constructs
instead of radiation to sterilize the
insects. This EIS also has some
applicability for population replace-
ment strategies for Aedes spp. or
Anopheles spp. using gene introgres-
sion/driver mechanism strategies.
(Page 42 [22])
The value of the 2008-EIS to environ-
mental risk assessments of tropical mos-
quitoes andor insect population replace-
ment strategies is difficult to discern, as
neither is considered in the 2008-EIS main
text (mosquitoes are briefly mentioned in
appendices C and D; population replace-
ment is mentioned once in appendixes E
and K [42]). Population replacement
strategies are intended to stably establish
transgenes in wild populations and repre-
sent a higher class of environmental
concern (see Table 2 on page 19 and
section 5.3.4.2 in [21]).
To examine the scientific quality of the
analysis of environmental impact in the
2008-EIS, we seek here to establish the
scope of the scientific evidence cited for
the five example applications given in its
executive summary (page vi in [42]):
1) Use of fluorescent marker constructs
in radiation sterilized fruit fly spe-
cies.
2) Use of sterilizing RDL constructs in
fruit fly species.
3) Use of female-killing RDL con-
structs in fruit fly species.
4) Use of fluorescent marker constructs
in radiation sterilized pink boll-
worm.
5) Use of sterilizing RDL constructs in
pink bollworm.
What Constitutes a ‘‘Substantial
Body of Scientific Evidence’’ in
the 2008-EIS?
The first mention of GM insects in a
published US regulatory document that
we can find is in a 2001 document entitled
Fruit Fly Cooperative Control Program, Final
Environmental Impact Statement—2001 [45],
which states that:
Biotechnological control methods
are currently under development
and are not available for program
use at this time. Because the cir-
cumstances surrounding their uses
are uncertain, information on their
potential effects upon land, water, or
air resources and quality cannot be
determined at this time. (Page 82)
In general, detailed information
relative to the environmental im-
pacts of those other forms of bio-
technological control are unavail-
able. No substantial body of
scientific evidence relative to evalu-
ating the impacts of this control
method exists, nor can it be sum-
marized within this document. (Page
31)
The value of this document, which dealt
with fruit fly suppression techniques, is to
establish a time period when the integra-
tion of biotechnological techniques in fruit
fly programs was, in the opinion of
APHIS, not tenable based on the then
available evidence. It also implies that a
‘‘substantial body of scientific evidence’’
encompassing information on ‘‘land, wa-
ter, or air resources’’ would be necessary
to revise this opinion. In the intervening
period between the drafting of the above
document ([45] started in 1999) and the
2008-EIS ([42] started in 2006), there was
a diametric change in the conclusions
reached with respect to the impact of
biotechnological/GM pest management.
If this change was not based on an
increased tolerance to risk, examination
of the references cited in the 2008-EIS
(there is no data presented in the docu-
ment) should allow identification of the
new body of evidence that was considered
sufficient to reverse the previous position;
there are approximately 170 scientific
publications cited in the 2008-EIS (not
including government reports, etc.). Sup-
porting File S3 shows all the published
written studies cited in the 2008-EIS that
could have been in any way reasonably
related to each of the five example
applications (regardless of whether or not
they were in fact cited in this context).
From this table it can be determined that
there was a substantial, relevant, and
diverse body of scientific evidence with
which to assess the likely environmental
impact of the use of fluorescent markers in
insects (example uses 1 and 4). This
includes laboratory studies in all four of
the target species and a wide range of
other insect species, although no published
field studies are cited.
However, for all experimental tech-
niques involving the release of sterile or
semi-sterile individuals with RDL con-
structs (example uses 2, 3, and 5 in the
executive summary of the 2008-EIS),
discussion could only have been limited
to two laboratory studies in one of the four
species covered by the document [28,35],
with an additional five studies in the
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[29,32,33,35,36] and one in a mosquito
[30]. No published field trial data was
cited. The small number of published
experimental studies cited in the 334 page
2008-EIS, upon which endorsement of
these GM techniques was based (sterilizing
constructs and female-killing constructs),
can very easily be missed even by
specialists. The principal reason for this
lack of clarity is the consideration within a
single document of a range of genetic
techniques in four different species, with a
large number of potential applications
across an entire nation (and potentially
internationally, page 21 [42]).
In this light, it is instructive to consider
how EIS documents could have looked in
2008 if separate EISs had been drafted for
each of the RDL constructs. This would
have permitted a much more comprehen-
sible consideration of the extensive exper-
imental literature relating to the use of
fluorescent markers in the four species
covered by the 2008-EIS (Mediterranean
fruit fly, Mexican fruit fly, oriental fruit fly,
and pink bollworm; see Supporting File
S3). At the same time, this would have
permitted clearer identification of which
combination of the seven cited laboratory-
based publications ([28–30,32,33,35,36],
investigating at least four distinct trans-
genic constructs) were considered a signif-
icant body of environmental evidence for
each of the transgenic approaches men-
tioned in the 2008-EIS executive summa-
ry. Furthermore, of the seven cited
publications, none included any informa-
tion on RDL constructs in the Mexican
fruit fly, oriental fruit fly, or pink bollworm
(two described RDL constructs in the
Mediterranean fruit fly [28,35]).
The Use of Unpublished
Evidence in Regulatory
Documents around the World
The 2008-EIS is presented as a scientific
document of global value ([37] and page
42 in [22]). Generally, scientific docu-
ments require that statements made within
them should conform to accepted norms
of scientific publications. Fundamentally,
this requires that statements made within
it should be established either through the
presentation of primary data or unambig-
uous citations of relevant written publica-
tions. Where unpublished citations are
used, it should not be to establish points
of central importance, and in all instances
where unpublished data is used, it should
be stated why it is justified (e.g., [46]). The
selective use of unpublished or non-peer
reviewed evidence to support contentious
conclusions has been repeatedly ques-
tioned (e.g., [47]). An example of unpub-
lished evidence referred to in the 2008-EIS
is a field trial conducted in 2007 that
involved the release of .20 million
fluorescently marked pink bollworm moths
onto 100 acres of isolated cotton plants in
Arizona. Despite being probably the most
referred to experiment in the 2008-EIS
(e.g., pages 40, 41, 55–57, and D-16 [42]),
all data generated during this publically
funded study remain unpublished. The
inclusion in the 2008-EIS of some selected
results and conclusions cannot substitute
for publication of the data and a detailed
description of the experimental procedures
in a manner that would enable indepen-
dent critical evaluation. Notably, US
federal regulations for the drafting of EIS
documents state:
No material may be incorporated by
reference unless it is reasonably
available for inspection by potential-
ly interested persons within the time
allowed for comment. Material
based on proprietary data which is
itself not available for review and
comment shall not be incorporated
by reference. (11502.21 [48])
Of the 14 granted permits, all to APHIS
units, no written experimental descriptions
and data have been published in 9 years of
field trials (though see [49–51], which
provide selected summaries of some re-
sults, but with insufficient experimental
descriptions and data to permit critical
evaluation). A peer-reviewed publication
by APHIS scientists is reportedly in
preparation [52]; however, after such a
long delay, even this welcome step could
not fully address the failure to release
experimental data in a timely manner
(e.g., before it is cited in regulatory
documents or when it is requested under
the Freedom of Information Act, see
below). If, for example, experimental
results had been submitted as part of a
permit application by a commercial or
independent third party, there is a well-
established precedent that such data
cannot be released by government agen-
cies without consent [53]. However, these
experiments may reasonably be viewed as
a form of publicly funded government
testing, which commonly involves routine
publication of data, e.g., the US National
Toxicology Program [54]. Additionally,
the failure of US regulators to publish data
(in this case their own data) prior to their
inclusion in regulatory documents repre-
sents a worrying precedent for the scien-
tific quality and transparency of future
environmental impact assessments.
The failure to cite published experi-
ments is also a feature of various docu-
ments issued by Malaysian regulatory
authorities relating to the release of A.
aegypti mosquitoes in 2010–2011. This
includes the failure of pre-release docu-
ments to cite published data for semi-field
trials (point 2 [3]) and predation toxicity
experiments, both of which are referred to
in released documents (point 5 [3]). The
Cayman Island regulatory authorities did
not, as far as we can determine, publish
any regulatory documents prior to the
release of transgenic mosquitoes in 2009.
However, subsequent to the scientific
presentations made about the releases on
3–7 November 2010 [55,56], limited
details of the release have become avail-
able [9,57] and have become the focus of
local (see reader comments to [58,59]) and
international controversy [2,9].
Do Restrictions to Public
Scrutiny of Regulatory
Documents Facilitate Practices
that Undermine Public
Confidence?
As detailed above, only two of the 14
permit applications granted to APHIS
research units have been published. It
was apparently the original intention of
the APHIS regulatory unit to immediately
publish all received permit applications,
based on a 2001 document issued by
APHIS as a part of its ‘‘expanding efforts
of APHIS to communicate with interested
entities and to make the permitting process
as transparent and understandable as
possible’’ (the original document is no
longer available on the APHIS website,
point 2c [60]). However, it appears that at
some point this practice was abandoned.
In an effort to obtain experimental
details we wrote to BRS-APHIS asking
for information on a specific permit
granted in 2005 (permit 05-118-01r), but
were informed in writing that information
was ‘‘only available through a FOIA
request’’ (a request under a Freedom of
Information Act). One of the authors
(FAR, a US citizen) filed an FOIA request
with APHIS in July 2008, which took 1
year and 11 months to be processed. It
resulted in a copy of the permit (which was
not previously publicly available) and
correspondence up to and including the
granting of the permit (Supporting File
S4), but crucially, no experimental data
was forthcoming. This is despite the
regulator (BRS-APHIS) stating it con-
tained no commercially sensitive informa-
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the Arizona Department of Agriculture,
page 2 Supporting File S4).
At least a partial explanation for the
lack of publically available information lies
with the use of an administrative proce-
dure called a ‘‘categorical exclusion’’ (CE),
which allows US regulators to rely on
earlier similar EAs rather than draft a new
one. CEs are the most frequently em-
ployed method of permit approval used by
US federal agencies. CEs speed up the
application process by removing the need
to regenerate largely redundant EA doc-
uments. As the time taken by APHIS to
grant FOIA requests greatly exceeds the 2
months it takes to approve most field trial
permits by applying CEs, the use of CEs
effectively removes all statutory require-
ments to make permits publically available
(despite the fact that permits are explicitly
subject to FOIA requests, page 8 [38]).
In a letter from the federal regulator
(BRS-APHIS) to the Arizona State De-
partment of Agriculture (obtained thor-
ough the FOIA request, page 2 Support-
ing File S4), it is argued that the use of a
CE is appropriate for the research pro-
posed in newly obtained 2005 permit
application because it was ‘‘similar and
equivalently contained’’ to experiments
assessed in the earlier published 2001-EA
[40]. It was argued that it was unnecessary
to generate a new EA as this is only
necessary ‘‘When a confined field release
of genetically engineered organisms or
products involves new species or organ-
isms or novel modifications that raise new
issues’’ (1372.5 d4 [43]). While it is
reasonable to argue that the degree of
physical containment described in the
2001-EA (pages 6–10 [40], which is made
available as Supporting File S5) and in the
newly obtained 2005 permit (pages 8–19
Supporting File S4) were similar, as both
used cages of the same design and the
same mode of moth transportation to the
experimental site, the degree of biological
containment differs.
The 2001-EA permit was granted for
work on a particular pink bollworm stock
with a simple fluorescent construct where
all released individuals had been sterilized
prior to the start of the experiment using a
dose of radiation established to be suffi-
cient to cause 99.9% sterility; in addition,
the wings of all females had been manually
removed [40]. The description in the
newly obtained 2005 permit detailed
experiments involving individuals with
transgenic RDL constructs that had not
been radiation sterilized and where all
individuals were fully winged. Most of the
proposed study is on two pink bollworm
stocks that possess a RDL construct based
on the RIDL system (Release of Insects
carrying a Dominant Lethal, a group of
diverse constructs developed by Oxitec
Ltd., one configuration of which is dis-
cussed here) in addition to a fluorescent
marker. The stocks are described in the
application as having sterility ‘‘as high as
100% with a range of 60%–100%’’,
though the applicants speculate that ste-
rility could be much higher under field
conditions (page 17 Supporting File S4).
Despite the fact that the degree of
biological containment built into the
2005 experiment was potentially dramat-
ically reduced compared to the earlier
2001-EA experiment by up to a 40%
increase in fertility and females being
capable of flight, this did not, in the
opinion of BRS-APHIS or Arizona state
officials, raise any significant new issues.
This poses the question of whether US
regulators consider all transgenic con-
structs in a given species equivalent. For
example, in the case of pink bollworm, has
the publication of the 2001-EA (assessing
caged experiments) and the 2005-EA
(assessing free release experiments), both
involving transgenic constructs of lowest
environmental concern, ensured that no
information on any subsequent applica-
tions involving more complex transgenic
constructs is disclosed? The Malaysian
national safety board have made a prodi-
gious effort to engage the public prior to
regulatory approval [61] and subsequent
to approval [3,62–66]. However, it is
noteworthy that the permit application
(made by the Malaysian Institute of
Medical Research) was not made publi-
cally available, and this is also the case for
the Cayman Islands trial, where even the
identity of the permit applicant is unclear
[57].
Established Precedents in US
Regulation of GM Insects and
Their Global Impact on Building
Confidence in GM Insect
Regulation
At the US federal level, the National
Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) regu-
lates protection of the US environment.
This act includes numerous statutory and
voluntary provisions for publishing infor-
mation and facilitating citizen engagement
in environmental decision-making process-
es (outlined in The Citizen’s Guide to NEPA:
Having Your Voice Heard [44]). However,
despite these advantages, the flow of
information to the public and scientific
domain over the last 9 years has been
limited. In fact, it can be argued that
dissemination of relevant information is so
restricted that it undermines the value of
public consultation exercises, as comments
will almost by definition be ill-informed
and readily dismissed as such.
If APHIS hopes to realize the reduced
costs and increased effectiveness that GM
insects may offer to its pest control
programs, without engendering public
mistrust, it would appear prudent to
reverse some of the precedents that have
become established in some of its units. In
this light, the regulation of GM insects in
the US would be greatly strengthened by
APHIS making the following procedural
changes (if necessary, being restricted to
experiments conducted at federal research
facilities):
1 Permit applications should be pub-
lished immediately upon determining
that the application is substantially
complete (as was the policy in 2001
[60]), without the deletion of scientifi-
cally important information (e.g., page
9 [38]). This change should be made
retrospectively, with all previously
granted permit applications being pub-
lished immediately.
2 Complete experimental data from field
trials substantially conducted at feder-
ally funded research facilities should be
routinely placed into the public domain
and this should be done retrospectively
for field trials that have already been
completed (the USDA website http://
www.usda.gov/open, which already
hosts 148 datasets unconnected to
GM insects, would appear to be well
suited for depositing raw data).
Both actions would be very much in line
with the advice of the USDA reform
advisory committee AC21 (Advisory Com-
mittee on Biotechnology and 21st Century
Agriculture, points 6 and 12 [67]). Finally,
given the deficiencies of the 2008-EIS
detailed above, it would appear advisable
that this document should not play any
role in justifying the future use of CEs or
permit approvals in any jurisdiction.
The fact that government agencies—
APHIS in the US and the Malaysian
Institute of Medical Research—are visibly
taking the lead in experimentally evaluat-
ing a very new technology, which has
already attracted some controversy, is a
very positive development. This should
make it much easier to ensure the free flow
of impartial information into the public
and scientific domain. Furthermore,
APHIS’ role, as not only the US regulator,
but its global position as the largest
generator of field data on GM insects
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commercial GM insect services, places it
in an unparalleled position to establish
positive regulatory precedents for this
developing technology. For example, if
APHIS were to announce that it would
prioritize the evaluation of GM insect
technologies where proprietary consider-
ations did not impede free exchange of
scientific information (see Supporting File
S2), this would build domestic confidence
in this technology and globally stimulate
the independent and interdisciplinary ex-
perimental studies that high quality envi-
ronmental impact assessments (EIAs) re-
quire in order to minimize the risk of
unacceptable harm to the environment.
Decisive steps by APHIS policymakers
could provide a boost to the efforts of
APHIS to transparently demonstrate the
scientific quality of its decision-making
processes and would also act as a powerful
positive global role model in this respect.
When Considering the Potential
Environmental Impacts of
Complex Biotechnological
Approaches, How Useful Are
Highly Generic Discussions?
Given our assertion that the discussion
of environmental impact in the available
regulatory documents is, in at least some
instances, insufficiently case specific to be
meaningful, it seems reasonable to attempt
to elucidate what level of specificity is
necessary for meaningful EIAs of GM
insects.
The discussion of well-understood and
very simple transgenic constructs (e.g.,
those expressing only a fluorescent marker)
could arguably be adequately considered
through generic discussions. However, this
is almost certainly not the case for the vast
majority of other types of transgenic
constructs, with diverse and potentially
complex properties when released into
wild populations. Here, we give one
relevant example to illustrate how out-
wardly small differences in the technical
engineering of transgenic constructs, the
species they are placed in, and the
application they are used for can result
in important differences in the environ-
mental hazards that should reasonably be
expected to receive expert consideration.
Meaningful Consideration Should Be
Specific to a Transgenic Construct in
a Specific Species
The RIDL (Oxitec Ltd.) configuration
described in [28,30] and the Horn &
Wimmer system ([29,31] Georg-August-
Universita ¨t Go ¨ttingen) are different types
of RDL constructs cited in the 2008-EIS
[42]. Both systems rely on expression of a
synthetic protein called tTA (tetracycline-
controlled transactivator [68]). In the
Horn & Wimmer system, low levels of
tTA expression are restricted to the first
few hours of embryonic development in
the progeny of released males, which then
die as embryos. In the RIDL system, tTA
is highly expressed both throughout the
body of the released males and in their
progeny until death at late larval stage
[28,30]. If ingestion of tTA by insectivores
in the environment warrants expert risk
assessments (the merits of doing this are
debated in the 2008-EIS, pages C-21, E-4
to E5, and E-24, and E-Handler letter
[42]), this concern clearly varies with the
type of system used. For instance, in the
Horn & Wimmer system only predation of
very early embryos needs to be considered,
while in the RIDL system [28,30] preda-
tion at all life stages would need to be
considered (embryonic, larval, and adult).
Furthermore, it is important for risk
assessments to be specific to a species, so
that the role it plays as a food source for
insectivores at various life stages can be
accurately assessed. This illustrates how
analysis of the environmental risks of one
transgene may not be applicable to a
different transgene even if there are
substantial underlying structural similari-
ties in the way they were engineered.
Finally, in many instances it may also be
necessary to discuss the impact of specified
transgene insertion sites, as the same
transgenic construct inserted at different
locations in the genome can significantly
vary the expressivity or penetrance of
phenotypic traits that could impact risk
assessments (e.g., the degree of sterility
[31] or effectiveness of female killing [35]).
Meaningful Consideration Should Be
Specific to an Application
SIT can be used in a wide range of
situations, the extremes of which can be
represented at one end of the spectrum as
preventative release programs (PRPs) and
the long-term suppression of large popu-
lations at the other. PRP releases occur
into areas where there are few or even no
fertile females and are intended to prevent
the establishment of pest populations in
areas at risk of infestation. The probability
of selecting for resistance genes present in
the wild population (which could allow the
unintended transfer of transgenes to the
fertile wild population) is proportional to
the number of transgenic fertilized eggs
generated. In PRP releases there may be
few if any of such eggs; however, in long-
term suppression programs there may be
billions of such eggs. Consequently, it can
be seen that the type of application has a
different probability of selecting for RDL
resistance.
This question of selection for RDL
resistance was specifically raised during
the public comment period of the 2008-
EIS (Jorge Hendrichs FAO/IAEA, page
E-24, and also by Alfred Handler USDA-
ARS, E-Handler letter page 269–270 [42])
and in prior literature [13]. This concern
is far from being a speculative hypothesis;
insensitive mutations to the VP16 domain
that forms half of the tTA protein have
been repeatedly generated in yeast (though
they are reported as recessive [69,70]). In
response to this concern, a rebuttal is given
on pages E-9 to E-13 of the 2008-EIS that
gives the unsubstantiated impression that
the probability of RDL resistance evolving
is equivalently low for all types of SIT
applications. However, the fact that resis-
tance has arisen to some extent to almost
all widely used insecticides provides a
striking illustration of the practical differ-
ence between events that cannot occur
(i.e., zero probability) from those that can
occur but with low probabilities. Despite
the establishment of standard laboratory
protocols to rapidly estimate the likelihood
of resistance arising to novel insect sup-
pression techniques [71–74], no such
experimental study has been published
for RDL techniques.
Generic Considerations of GM
Insects Are Often of Limited
Scientific Value
The value of EIAs largely composed of
generic or incomplete discussions, which
are neither technique nor species specific,
are as a consequence of very limited value
and prone to generating conclusions that
can be misleading. The degree of specific-
ity necessary for meaningful EIAs is
explicitly addressed in the 2007 North
American Plant Protection Organization
(NAPPO) guidelines on confined field
releases of transgenic arthropods [75]
and the 2006 Food and Agriculture
Organization and International Atomic
Energy Agency/(FAO/IAEA) report enti-
tled Status and Risk Assessment of the Use of
Transgenic Arthropods in Plant Protection (sec-
tion 5.3.4.2, pages 22–24 [21]). Both of
these documents are cited in the 2008-EIS
[42]. The FAO/IAEA report has a non-
exhaustive list of approximately 60 ques-
tions focused on hazard identification, and
this list is reproduced in full in the 2008-
EIS (page D-5 to D-8 [42]). The first two
questions are addressed in the 2008-EIS in
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clear discussion of relevant information.
However, this approach is subsequently
abandoned, resulting in a large proportion
of relevant questions from the FAO/IAEA
[21], EFSA [12], and NAPPO (which is
legally binding [75]) documents not being
recognizably addressed anywhere in the
2008-EIS (though it should be noted that
the EFSA document did not exist at the
time of the drafting of the 2008-EIS).
Finally, while it is generally accepted that
biotechnology regulation should be on a
‘‘case-by-case basis’’, this clearly requires
that regulatory documents be specific
enough to a case to be scientifically
meaningful.
The Release of GM Mosquitoes
in the Cayman Islands and
Malaysia (2009–2011)
The A. aegypti mosquito is the principal
vector of dengue fever, a human disease
that is of pressing concern in many
countries around the world [76]. The field
trials discussed below are focused on
developing a novel approach to control this
disease, through the release of genetically
sterilized A. aegypti males of a stock called
OX513A (which contains a configuration
of the RIDL system developed by Oxitec
Ltd., UK). The field trial(s) on the Carib-
bean Cayman Islands (an overseas territory
of the UK), which appear to have com-
menced in 2009 and have been reported to
be ongoing (in October 2010, point 7 [63]),
involved the large-scale release of OX513A
mosquitoes (which carry the configuration
of the RIDL system discussed above
[28,30]). In 2010, we searched the web
pages of the Cayman Mosquito Research
and Control Unit (http:/www.gov.ky/
mrcu), which reportedly conducted the
trial, and other pages of the government
of the Cayman Islands, but were unable to
find any regulatory documents on the trial.
However, on 13 January 2011, over a year
after releases commenced [1], a document
was uploaded to the UK Parliament
website entitled ‘‘Risk Analysis – OX513A
Aedes aegypti Mosquito for Potential Release
on the Cayman Islands (Grand Cayman)’’
[57]. This deposition (apparently by a UK
government department) occurred in re-
sponse to written parliamentary questions
by Countess Mar of the Lords Chamber
[1,77]. Unfortunately, key details about the
document are omitted, including the iden-
tity of its authors, and as a result the origin
and purpose of the document is unclear.
This is perhaps unsurprising, as the Cay-
man Islands were at the time of the releases
(and remain) one of the few areas in the
world without any enacted specific legisla-
tion regulating the release of living GM
organisms into the environment (see
Figure 1 and [78]). From answers to UK
parliamentary questions it can be deduced
that the document was part of the notifica-
tion to the UK government from Oxitec
Ltd. that they had started exporting
mosquito eggs on 4 November 2009 [1]
that were intended for release in the
Cayman Islands. This notification, re-
quired under European Community regu-
lation 1946/2003, was received by the UK
government on 1 December 2010 [77,79].
The document is dated October 2009,
which is the same month as the earliest
public pre-releasewritten notificationofthe
releases we can find [80]. Based on the date
and the content of the document, it appears
that it formed at least part of the basis for
the regulatory approval of the very first
intentional free release of GM mosquitoes
in the world. Consequently, it is interesting
to examine how it conforms to scientific
expectations for an EIA; it is, however,
important to note that the document is not
complete (for example, it includes drafting
notes [81] and does not include experi-
mental details of the releases).
Despite a number of unambiguous
biological misunderstandings, collectively
these probably have few practical conse-
quences for identifying potential hazards
of OX513A mosquitoes (e.g., page 2 [57],
horizontal gene transfer between eukary-
otes [82,83] and fertile hybrids between
insects species [84]). However, of greater
importance is the very poor referencing of
the document [57], particularly of key
points. For example:
The characteristics of the OX513A
Aedes aegypti have been thoroughly
evaluated by several institutions
worldwide, e.g. in France, Malaysia
(Lee et al, 2008) and Thailand
(Khongtak et al, 2009).
Both of the above citations are from
reports that are not publically available.
Of the three citations supporting another
questionable pivotal scientific assertion—
However, classical SIT has hitherto
not been successful with mosquitoes
such as Aedes in spite of much effort
by the International Atomic Energy
Agency (IAEA) and others because
gamma radiation, used in classical
SIT to sterilise the insects, renders
the mosquitoes very weak and unfit
to compete with the wild male
mosquitoes. However, this problem
seems to have been overcome be-
cause OX513A uses genetic meth-
ods instead of radiation to achieve
sterility, therefore the genetically
sterile insects have been reported
to be fitter and competitive (Jain
2006; Lee et al. 2006; Phuc et al.
2007;).
—Jain 2006 is a newspaper article, Lee
et al. 2006 is missing from the bibliogra-
phy, and Phuc et al. 2007 includes no data
on the relative fitness of male mosquitoes.
Regardless of any potential shortcomings,
this document does, however, give the first
complete listing (that we are aware of) of
all the donor organisms from which the
OX513A construct is built.
However, the most troubling aspect of
this risk assessment document is the
absence of any discussion of potential
environmental or health hazards that are
specific to the released OX513A stock
(distinct from potential hazards that are
shared with a non-transgenic mosquito
stock). This striking omission appears to be
justified in the last section of the docu-
ment, which is reproduced below.
3. Statement on the overall risk
analysis
Risk analysis has been conducted on
the hypothetical release of genetically
modified Aedes aegypti mosquitoes
expressing a self-limiting trait and a
marker gene, as present in strain
OX513A. The independent risk
assessment was conducted by over
70 Malaysian scientists as part of a
UNDP/University of Malaya spon-
sored workshop on the Risk Assess-
ment of Transgenic Insects in Nov
2008. The proceedings of the work-
shop have been written up and are
available (Beech et al, 2009).
The conclusions of the risk assess-
ment were that a potential release of
OX513A male mosquitoes would
have a negligible risk to human
health or the environment, although
certain risks were identified as low
risk from the trial:
[This is followed by the repetition of three
of the four potential hazards listed in
Beech et al. 2009 [85] as having been
assigned ‘‘low’’ or ‘‘medium’’ risk (as
opposed to all the other listed hazards
which were assigned ‘‘negligible risk’’/
‘‘not important to human health or the
environment’’). The reasons of the omis-
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unclear.]
While it should be kept in mind that the
purpose of the document is unclear, the
suggestion that Beech et al. (2009) [85]
played any role at all in approving the
world’s first intentional release of a trans-
genic mosquito (into an inhabited town) is
very surprising. Primarily, because Beech et
al. (2009) is: (1) a report on a teaching
exercise conducted as part of a capacity
building project; and (2) a generic risk
assessment. While the hypothetical teach-
ing exercise is described as being a mass
release of RIDL (a trademark applied to a
number of differently configured con-
structs, one of which is present in
OX513A) mosquitoes, it is not identified
as being specific to any named stock (see
discussion of the limited scientific value of
generic discussions). Finally, the ‘‘indepen-
dence’’ of the Beech et al. (2009) risk
assessment, as stated in the passage repro-
duced above, is valid in the sense that no
CaymanIslands scientistsarelisted asbeing
participants of the workshop session.
The field trial approved by the Malay-
sian National Biosafety Board was applied
for by the Malaysian Institute for Medical
Research and releases occurred from
December 2010 to January 2011. It
involved the temporary small-scale releas-
es of GM A. aegypti mosquitoes at two
locations in mainland Malaysia (Pahang
and Melaka). The Malaysian government
has made impressive efforts to establish a
clear regulatory framework (Biosafety Act
2007, which came into effect in December
2009) and is a party to the Cartagena
Protocol on Biosafety. The decision to
approve the trial was taken with a
substantial degree of public and political
consultation (e.g., question 1 [63]; [61]). A
significant amount of comprehensible
information was made available prior to
release approval. However, the permit
application is not publically available. A
document entitled ‘‘risk assessment re-
port’’ by the Malaysian Genetic Advisory
Committee provides an abbreviated sum-
mary in its 14 pages of the process of risk
assessment in permit approval [64]. The
failure to reproduce the full risk assessment
matrix they used to identify the potential
hazards they considered (unlike the report
that appears to have been used as a model
[86]) weakens the scientific value of the
document and undermines its ability to
transparently demonstrate what plausible
hazards have received adequate expert
consideration (see discussion below). Sig-
nificantly, the document highlights three
references that were particularly valuable
sources of information in their risk assess-
ment. The first was the 2008-EIS, clearly
establishing that this scientifically deficient
document is being used as the basis for
regulatory approvals around the world.
The second was the risk assessment and
results of the Cayman Islands field trial (no
part of which was made publically avail-
able until after the Malaysian release had
commenced), establishing that despite the
unanswered ethical questions raised by
this trial [2], it too is being used as the
basis for regulatory approvals around the
world. These significant omissions in the
information made publically available
Figure 1. Global extent of legislation relating to living genetically modified organisms by 2010. One hundred and sixty governments are
parties to the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety, and ten that are not parties have chosen to submit documents to the Biosafety Clearing-House (an
instrument set up under the Cartagena Protocol) relating to ‘‘National Laws, Regulations and Guidelines’’ governing the release or transportation of
living GM organisms. Of the remaining countries, the US, Israel, and Singapore are known to have specific laws regulating living GM organisms (all the
above countries and categories are colored in blue). Consequently, countries and territories colored blue have at least some specific laws governing
the release or transportation of living GM organisms. For the remaining 21 countries that are not parties to the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety and
some overseas or disputed territories, it is unclear if they have any relevant laws (colored yellow). The locations of field trials mentioned in the text are
indicated by arrows. Malaysia and the US both have comprehensive, specific legislation, and Malaysia is also a party to the Cartagena Protocol on
Biosafety. While the UK is a party to the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety, the Cayman Islands (which are a UK overseas territory) has not become a
party to the protocol despite encouragement to do so by the UK government [78,112]. A quote from a senior researcher of the research institute
conducting the field trial in 2009 [9] confirms that the Cayman Islands had no enacted legislation relating to living GM organisms (only draft
legislation is mentioned [113]). See Supporting File S6 for additional map details.
doi:10.1371/journal.pntd.0001502.g001
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Malaysia, and the US leaves external
scientists in the uncomfortable position of
having to rely on media reports, oral
presentations, meeting minutes, and pat-
ent documents as their only timely means
to obtain some scientific details (e.g., [4]).
Summaries of EIAs Can Be of
Limited Scientific Value and
May Not Build Public
Confidence
Without the pre-release publication of
complete risk assessment documents de-
tailing all the potential hazards analyzed,
it is often impossible to establish which
have been considered (and by whom) and
if any obvious hazards have been over-
looked for rigorous consideration. It is
anticipated that failure of regulatory
authorities to convincingly advertise the
scientific quality of their decision making,
prior to releases (when public interest is
high), risks eroding public confidence
even when experiments proceed without
incident. Below is an illustrative discus-
sion of an obvious potential hazard
specific to OX513A about which we are
unable to find any written evidence in
pre-release documents that it has received
regulatory consideration.
The particular RIDL construct in
OX513A is engineered to express the
synthetic protein called tTA (NCBI ac-
cession number CAI26306.1) at very high
levels in all cells at all life stages and in
both sexes when released into the wild
[28,30]. If this RIDL construct is placed
into blood feeding mosquito species, there
is the plausible concern that females could
inject tTA into humans along with
mosquito salivary gland fluids that are
transferred as part of a normal bite.
Importantly, this concern arises even if
only male mosquitoes (which never bite)
are released. This is because tTA-express-
ing females would occur in the environ-
ment in at least three circumstances:
firstly, if heritable resistance to the RIDL
construct was to arise in the wild;
secondly, while the mechanical removal
of females prior to release is highly
effective, it is not 100%; and thirdly,
when RIDL stocks are only partially
sterile under field conditions. In fact,
OX513A males are only partially sterile,
and when they mate with wild females
they will produce 2.8%–4.2% the normal
number of eggs, half of which will be
biting daughters [30,63,64]. If these
laboratory estimates of fertility prove
representative of field conditions, then
even if only males are released, it is
probable that some human inhabitants
will be bitten by transgenic females.
The probable presence of transgenic
females in the environment requires that
a more complex series of potential
hazards would need to be considered in
a credible EIA than would be necessary if
the presence of females in the environ-
ment was highly improbable. For exam-
ple, the assumption that the transgenic
tTA protein is not expected to be secreted
into the salivary fluid (which is injected as
part of a normal bite) because it does not
have a secretory signal peptide sequence
is questionable based on the fact that (1)
not all proteins found in the salivary fluid
of A. aegypti have identifiable secretory
signal sequences [87]; and (2) levels of
expression of tTA proteins are anticipated
to be extremely high in all cells ([28,30]
even in heterozygotes). Therefore, it may
not be reasonable to assume that physi-
ologically significant amounts of tTA will
not be found in the salivary fluid. While it
is well established that almost any sub-
stance the human body is exposed to has
the potential to cause an undesirable
allergic response, the probability that a
given compound elicits such a response is
extremely low [88]. However, the hazard
to sensitive humans is sufficiently great
that all GM plants intended for human
consumption are assessed for allergenicity
[88]. The desirability to assess the aller-
genicity of transgenes in GM insects is
specifically mentioned in a recent Euro-
pean Union (EU) document that recom-
mends using the food safety framework
established for GM plants (pages 97–99
and 135 [12]). The hazard associated with
transgene expression in the salivary
glands is specifically mentioned (page
135 [12]).
The question of whether or not the
illustrative concern outlined above repre-
sents in reality a genuine allergen hazard
to some humans (it quite possibly does not,
though this needs to be experimentally
tested) is in our opinion not the only
question of importance raised by the pre-
release regulatory response to field trial
applications involving OX513A. A more
generally important question is, how could
field testing of OX513A progress to the
point of large-scale releases into human
populated areas with there being any
doubt that this fairly obvious hazard had
received rigorous scientific consideration?
The failure of the regulatory authorities
involved to transparently communicate
what scientific consideration this hazard
received raises the question of how more
complex hazards have been dealt with.
This lack of clarity is particularly perplex-
ing, as many pertinent facts relating to the
above hazard could have easily been
established using standard laboratory tech-
niques or caged field trials (and would
have been of sufficient interest to warrant
publication). The specific concern about
partial fertility of OX513A was reportedly
submitted to the Malaysian regulatory
authority in the pre-approval public con-
sultation period by at least one organiza-
tion (Third World Network point 2 [89],
and presumably in the meetings they had
with the Genetic Modification Advisory
Committee [64]). However, it is not
possible to discern from any pre-release
documents that it received any attention.
It is noteworthy that the risk assessment
conducted by Beech et al. (2009) clearly
makes the assumption that the hypothet-
ical RIDL stocks they are considering are
100% sterile and that no transgenic
females are accidentally released (see
consideration of potential hazards 20 and
24, respectively, in appendix 1 of [85]).
While this may be a reasonable simplifying
assumption for a basic teaching exercise, it
is not a reasonable assumption for a
ground-breaking real-world analysis (par-
ticularly where the proposed release stock,
OX513A, is reported to be partially fertile
and females are to be removed prior to
release using a manual method). The
impact of this assumption can clearly be
seen in one of the two listed potential
hazards that mention a deleterious allergic
response to being bitten (potential hazard
20, [85]), which only notes that ‘‘Males
don’t bite and take in blood, only females
bite’’. Ignoring the probable presence of
transgenic females in the environment
results in all the potential hazards stem-
ming from injection during blood feeding
being ignored (the same simplifying as-
sumption is also made in appendix I [90]).
Consequently, allergic responses of hu-
mans to mosquito bites is implausibly
given a lower risk assessment (‘‘very
negligible’’) than the possibility that the
RIDL transgene may cause male mosqui-
toes to acquire the ability to blood feed
(‘‘negligible’’ potential hazard 1, [85]).
This is despite the fact that all males of
the over 3,000 known species of mosqui-
toes are incapable of blood feeding.
Finally, it should be noted that even if it
is accepted that there is a pressing need for
new approaches to stop insects from
spreading human disease, it cannot be
reasonably argued that the particular
configuration of the RIDL system in
OX513A represents the only feasible SIT
approach (e.g., [14,91]) or indeed the only
transgenic SIT approach (e.g., [29,31] or
[34], which is an alternative configuration
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is limited to flight muscles).
Credible Risk Assessments of
GM Insects Require a
Documented, Multi-Disciplinary
Approach
The consideration of even the single
hypothetical concern above illustrates how
important a multi-disciplinary approach
can be in assessing environmental risk.
While it is essential to consult unbiased
molecular biologists to elucidate the prop-
erties of the transgenic constructs, it is also
necessary to include and document the
involvement of immunologists, medical
entomologists, and ecologists working in
disease-endemic areas. This breadth of
skills and knowledge is unlikely to be
present in the offices of regulatory agencies
and may not even be present in small
expert panels.
Admittedly, a more inclusive conven-
tional scientific process is likely to be
initially slower than proceeding to field
trials with significant voids in understand-
ing. It may, however, ultimately allow
more rapid progress by avoiding delays
resulting from unnecessary controversy.
We consider it self-evident that only
through high levels of scientific and public
confidence will it ever be possible to create
a situation where the granting of GM
insect permits can occur in a timely and
uncontroversial manner. Furthermore, fol-
lowing the standard publication-based
scientific process will enable the large
number of developing nations that are
reported to be interested in this technology
more opportunity to develop systems that
are not only suited to their requirements
but also under their direct control.
A Checklist for Assessing the
Probable Scientific Quality of
Regulatory Release Approvals,
Based on Publically Available
Pre-Release Documents
Informed consent can provide a
basis for trust provided that those
who are to consent are not offered a
flood of uncheckable information,
but rather information whose accu-
racy they can check and assess for
themselves. This is demanding. […]
Increasing transparency can pro-
duce a flood of unsorted information
and misinformation that provides
little but confusion unless it can be
sorted and assessed. It may add to
uncertainty rather than to trust.
([92], see also [93])
Assessing the scientific quality of regu-
latory decisions can be a daunting pros-
pect even for specialist scientists, and this is
also often the case for the public, journal-
ists, and lawmakers. Therefore, we present
a checklist in Table 1 to provide a
comprehensible starting point with which
non-specialists can assess whether regula-
tory decisions are likely to be of (1)
demonstrably high scientific quality, or
(2) indeterminate or low scientific quality.
It is crucial to note that regulatory
decisions are never undertaken with com-
plete scientific evidence being available,
and this is just as true for GM insects as it
is for considerations of new insecticides or
building practices. Consequently, a degree
of uncertainty in the conclusions of EIAs is
inherent and cannot reasonably be used as
an absolute argument against granting
permission for experimental field trials or
applied uses of novel techniques (article
10.6 [94]). Regulators attempt to balance
the risks and likely value of novel tech-
niques or proposed experiments through
evidence-based analysis of risk.
The checklist in Table 1 is based on
the assumption that ‘‘risk assessment [of
GM insects] should be carried out in a
scientifically sound and transparent man-
ner’’ (annex III [94]), and where regula-
tory decisions are of high scientific
quality it is in the regulators’ strategic
interest to advertise this prior to releases
commencing (assuming they are allowed
to do so by permit applicants, see below).
Many of the criteria on the checklist
relating directly to scientific quality are
dealt with in existing international guide-
lines and statutes (e.g., NAPPO, EFSA,
FAO/IAEA, [20], see review [95]).
However, those criteria relating to scien-
tific transparency are rarely codified
except in domestic legislation (though
see [20,96] and at least five working
papers in [22], and see article 23 [94]).
Recognizing that a simple dichotomous
non-exhaustive checklist may not capture
the complexity of every situation, the
c h e c k l i s td o e sp r o v i d eas t a r t i n gp o i n t
with which non-specialists can identify
approvals, which most scientists would
consider to have a demonstrably high
quality scientific basis. It should be
emphasized that the checklist is intended
to provide an overall assessment of
quality, and the inability to check a single
box in the left column should not
necessarily be seen as a good reason for
rejection of a sound scientific basis for
approval. Furthermore, it should be
noted that many of the criteria in the
checklist relate to universal scientific
principles, and where there is a degree
of subjectivity the public should be able
to contact and receive advice from
impartial local or international academics
in almost any scientific discipline.
If most boxes in the right hand column
can be checked, it is reasonable to assume
that the scientific basis of release approval
is likely to be widely questioned, either on
the basis that inadequate pre-release
information is being made available, or
that available information reflects a genu-
inely low quality scientific basis for ap-
proval. With respect to the former possi-
bility, it is important to note that
restrictions on the publication of informa-
tion is often, quite legally, imposed upon
regulators by permit applicants or their
collaborators (e.g., [97], see pages 7 and 8
[98]). The extent to which this can
interfere with the ability of regulators to
meaningfully communicate with the public
can be illustrated using US guidelines
(page 9 [38]). Permit applicants to the
US regulator (BRS-APHIS) can request
that fundamental scientific information be
excluded from publication by the regula-
tory authority on the basis that it is
confidential business information. Exclud-
ed information can ‘‘often reasonably [be]
justified’’ to include the identity of trans-
gene donor organisms, transgene names,
transgene descriptions, genetic transfor-
mation methods, and even the phenotype
of the release organism (in some circum-
stances, even the species name of the
proposed release organism and its ‘‘phe-
notypic category’’ can be withheld, page 9
[38]). Given the breadth of information
that can legally be excluded from publi-
cation, it can be very difficult for regula-
tors to publish scientifically meaningful
information on permit applications. This
can fundamentally undermine efforts of
regulators to build public confidence,
which is often a statutory and strategic
objective of regulators around the globe
(e.g., points 6 and 12 [67], article 23 [94]).
Furthermore, because the configurations
of the transgenic constructs that have so
far been released are already widely
known (e.g., mosquitoes, see [28,30] and
pending patent application PCT/
GB2004/003263; pink bollworm, see
[99] and Supporting File S4), it is difficult
to identify the desired consequences of
such restrictions.
Finally, while it appears a minor
technical issue, the importance of access
to relevant biological material should not
be underestimated in stimulating diverse
and independent scientific study (Table 1,
www.plosntds.org 10 January 2012 | Volume 6 | Issue 1 | e1502eighth point on checklist). In the absence
of a concerted effort to secure access
without onerous restrictions, indepen-
dent researchers will likely suffer the
same restrictions that have limited the
unbiased study of commercialized GM
crops [100].
Conclusions
From an historical perspective, it is
interesting to note that this is not the first
time controversy has arisen around field
trials of a genetic pest-control technique
(as has previously been pointed out in
[15,19], page 46 [23], and page 12 [24]).
In 1975, a World Health Organization
(WHO) sponsored field trial in India of an
earlier form of non-transgenic genetic pest
control collapsed due to a failure to rebut
false accusations of exploitative motives by
an international funder of the trial [101].
Table 1. Checklist for assessing the scientific quality of approvals for un-caged field trials, based on the examination of documents
made publically available by regulators prior to the start of releases.
Likely Features of a Demonstrably
High Scientific Quality Release Approval
Likely Features of an Indeterminate or
Low Scientific Quality Release Approval
-Suitable for less restricted field trials and de-regulation. -Potentially suitable for limited field trials (but probably not
in circumstances likely to involve transgenic insects biting humans)
% Complete scientific details of the proposed field
trial can be made available during pre-approval
public consultations and notifications (e.g.,
11500.1.b. [48], article 23 [94], sections 52 &
54 [114], page 18 [115]).
% Significant scientific details of the proposed field trial cannot be
made available during pre-approval public consultations and
notifications (most likely at the request of the permit applicant or
their collaborators, sections 184 & 185 [114], article 21 [94],
pages 8–9 [38]).
% Complete list of all potential hazards considered
by regulators is published (e.g., sections 52 & 54
[114]), along with their determined risk classification
by named individuals.
% No complete list of potential hazards considered by regulators is
published by them, or only a summary is made available (recognizing
that publication of only a post-release summary is legally required by
the 161 parties to the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety, article 20.3.c [94]).
% A substantial body of relevant interdisciplinary
research is cited from multiple independent groups
with no serious gaps in areas of importance for
assessing potential environmental impact and
human health (e.g., pages 43–44 [115], article 15 [94]).
% Scientific points of importance for assessing potential environmental
impact and human health are based on no evidence (e.g., 11502.22. [48]),
or a small number of publications from a single laboratory or
commercial company.
% Documents concentrate on the issues that are
truly significant and specific to the case under
consideration, rather than the amassing of needless
detail. (e.g., page 159 [20], 11500.1.b. [48], page 19
and table 6.3 [115]).
% Documents are overly generic, use obscure language (e.g., page
160 [20], 11502.8 [48], page 72 [115]), unnecessarily long, or fail to
adequately address points of importance for environmental
protection or human health.
% The majority of data cited in regulatory documents
is published, ideally in peer-reviewed journals (e.g.,
pages 43–44 [115]). No scientific points of fundamental
importance for environmental protection or human
health rely on unpublished data or no data at all
(unless explicitly stated, e.g., 11502.22. [48]).
% Substantial reference is made to data that is unpublished at the time
of the permit application or is published in a form that cannot be
publically accessed (e.g., during the time period allowed for public
consultations 11502. 21 [48]).
% Any prior data, obtained from field trials in other
countries, cited in support of permit approval is
widely recognized as having been conducted in
an ethical manner (e.g., [103,25,104,96], article 23 [94]).
% Prior data, obtained from field trials in other countries, cited in
support of permit approval does not conform to minimal international
norms in terms of ethics, public notification, and environmental
protection, and was not within an appropriate legal framework.
% A protocol is given by regulators that would allow
the unique identification of the stocks that have
received authorization for release (e.g., integration
site sequence section, 2.1.2.4 [75], annex III 9.c [94]).
% No protocols are provided that would allow the unique identification
of the stocks that have received authorization for release; a prerequisite
to independent verification that unauthorized stocks were not accidentally
released or that transgene integration sites remained stable.
% Evidence of a history of access to relevant biological
material by independent researchers is apparent or
it is indicated that transgenic stocks were deposited
at a stock center.
% No evidence of provisions having been made for allowing access
to biological material by independent researchers.
% Where a trial involves probable biting of humans by
insects expressing transgenic proteins that could be
transferred to humans during biting (e.g., due to
expression in salivary glands), it is unambiguously
and publically documented prior to releases
commencing that appropriate experimental
allergenicity data has been considered by regulators
(e.g., pages 97–99 & 135 [12,88]).
% Where a trial involves probable biting of humans by insects expressing
transgenic proteins that could be transferred to humans during biting
(e.g., due to expression in salivary glands), there is no pre-release
documentation that adequate experimental allergenicity data has
been considered by regulators.
% Information in documents provided by the regulator
is clear, understandable, and accurate with respects
to all points of fundamental importance for
environmental protection and human health
(e.g., 11500.1.b. [48]).
% Information in documents provided by the regulator is unclear
(e.g., page 160 [20], 11502.8 [48], page 72 [115]) or inaccurate
on points of fundamental importance for environmental
protection and human health.
Citations given in the above checklist are intended to provide for non-specialist readers a small number of relevant passages from national laws, international
agreements, scientific literature, or regulatory guidelines.
doi:10.1371/journal.pntd.0001502.t001
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the entire international WHO program,
which had been developed over more than
a decade. An article written at the time
entitled ‘‘Germ-War Allegations Force
WHO out of Indian Mosquito Project’’
makes sobering reading [102] and illus-
trates that the power of public opinion in
the adoption or rejection of new technol-
ogies should not be underestimated (pages
11–14 [24]). This was particularly unfor-
tunate, as earlier field trials had shown
that the techniques under evaluation had
considerable potential and may have
played a role in improving or saving an
unknown number of lives [15]. In retro-
spect, the capacity of the WHO to rebut
the allegations would have been enhanced
by adhering to those principles and
benchmarks applied in contemporary clin-
ical trials that are specifically intended to
avoid the appearance of exploitative
behavior [96,103], particularly when op-
erating in developing countries [104].
In 2004 it was noted, in the context of
GM insects, by professor Paul Thompson
(page 12 [24]) that erosion of public
confidence in regulators tends to lead to
individuals or groups asserting rights to
withhold consent for technological devel-
opment. While this may not initially be
recognized by regulatory bodies and
permit applicants as a serious strategic
problem, assertion of legal opt-out rights
can severely hamper technology adoption,
particularly where it is difficult or impos-
sible to precisely physically constrain (as is
the case for flying GM insects; see also
controversy about dispersion of pollen
from GM plants). It appears that such a
situation may already have arisen, with
plans by APHIS to use a transgenic pink
bollworm stock expressing a fluorescent
marker (OX1138B [105]) in their ongoing
suppression programs in Arizona, New
Mexico, and California, where the opt-out
rights of organic cotton farmers may
prevent this (see discussion on pages 17–
22 [106]). This is despite 9 years of large-
scale publically funded experiments by
APHIS, where units within APHIS have
acted as both regulator and the sole permit
holder. Even though, opt-out rights prob-
ably have limited scientific merit (though
this still remains to be established in a
clear and concise publically available
regulatory document) with a well under-
stood fluorescent marker (Ds-red; see the
large amount of laboratory and field
experimental data in Supporting File S3)
in a non-biting insect, on a crop that is not
indented for human consumption.
For GM insect technologies as a whole
to avoid abandonment before it is possible
to determine what value they possess, the
perception that accurate and informed
public engagement is a means to delay
technological development [107] must be
rejected (prompt, bold steps by APHIS
could prove pivotal). Not least because
public acceptance of particular biotechno-
logical techniques can be high when they
are perceived to provide advances of real
value (e.g., [108,109]). While it may
appear naı ¨ve to argue for pre-release
access to accurate scientific information
and a high quality multi-disciplinary
approach, it is in our opinion even more
naı ¨ve to expect that the development of
GM insect technologies will progress far in
its absence.
Subsequent to the acceptance of this
article, the first peer-reviewed studies
about GM insect field trials were pub-
lished [110,111].
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